jctr.org.zm - Quarterly Bulletin; Bulletin 67

In the discussion going on about the Constitution in Zambia, the proper role of Parliament in oversight is emphasised. The Mung’omba Draft Constitution, for example, point out the need to have Parliamentary oversight in loan contraction process in Zambia. Markus Nuding, Lusaka staff of Germany Technical Cooperation (GTZ), shares in this article the significance that Parliament has, for example, in the budget and checking that spending decisions are in line with national priorities.

Parliaments have an important role to play in delivering governance which is good for poverty reduction and democracy. But in Zambia the Parliament is weak and ineffective. Cooperating Partners have tended to neglect the Parliament, preferring to deal with the Executive and sometimes with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Such neglect (e.g., sidelining Parliament during the Fifth National Developemnt Plan (FNDP) process, the Joint Assistance Strategy, the Aid Policy, the Poverty Reduction Support etc.) has done nothing to address Parliaments’ marginalisation, or to enhance its effectiveness.

There are however, some encouraging signs. As Cooperating Partner’s practice (to some extent) has shifted from that of conditionality to country ownership, they have slowly begun to appreciate the importance of an effective Parliament and to realise that it might play an important role in ensuring that aid is spent effectively.

Governance refers to the system of actors, processes and rules through which decisions are made and authority is exercised or even shorter: how political power is gained and how political power is used in a society. Relations between the state and its citizens are a particularly important aspect of governance, because the state sets and polices a society’s formal rules. Good governance (ultimately, governance which is good for poverty reduction) requires state capability, accountability and responsiveness. State capability concerns the ability of the state to formulate and implement policies that are effective in reducing poverty.

Accountability concerns the relationships between those who make decisions and those on whose behalf such decisions are made (or those who feel the impact of those decisions). When citizens are able to demand that the state provides justifications for its action, and are able to sanction the state if it fails to do what it has promised, then there is accountability. The state is considered responsive if it seeks to identify and meet the needs of its citizens.

Parliaments and Parliamentarians play a variety of roles. Their primary roles are those of legislation, oversight and representation. Legislation is about passing the laws which constitute a country’s legal framework. Oversight is about keeping an eye on the activities of the Executive, and holding the Executive to account on behalf of citizens. A particularly important element of oversight concerns the budget; checking that spending decisions are in line with national priorities. Representation is about collecting, aggregating and expressing the concerns, opinions and preferences of citizen/voters.

Mapping the roles of Parliaments onto the elements of good governance indicates the contribution which Parliaments can make to the delivery of good governance. Legislation is part of state capability. Lawmaking is an important way in which capable states formulate and implement policies. Parliamentary oversight can contribute to ensuring that the relationship between the state and its citizens is one which is characterised by accountability.

And representation is crucial to responsiveness; there is little chance of political decision-makers being responsive if citizens’ views are not transmitted effectively by their political representatives. There is more to good governance than Parliamentary representation, legislation and oversight, but in the absence of a Parliament which can effectively perform these roles, good governance – and particularly good democratic governance – will be elusive.

First, Parliament is ineffective. There have been few systematic efforts in Zambia to assess and compare Parliamentary performance and the contribution of the Parliament to deliver good governance. This is partly because it is difficult, and partly because Cooperating Partners have made insufficient effort in this regard.

But the evidence suggests that in practice, the Parliament is ineffective. Rather than enhancing state capability, accountability and responsiveness, the Parliament is often little more than “rubber-stamp” legislatures, approving the Executive’s plans and doing little to deliver good governance or poverty reduction.

Second, Parliament lacks resources. There are various reasons for this poor Parliamentary performance. Often, Parliamentarians lack the knowledge, skills and resources to do their jobs effectively, may be more concerned with retaining their seat than with holding the Executive to account, or – if they do seek to vigorously hold the Executive to account – find that they lose their seat before long (see by-elections in Zambia or the very prominent “MP-buying” by the government through effecting government jobs). And in Zambia, women are drastically under-represented in Parliament.

The Parliament itself lacks the institutional capacity and resources which it needs. Parliamentary rules and procedures are poorly developed, Parliamentary committees are weak and there are more basic infrastructural problems. Such problems include a lack of access to information, information technology, and library facilities, a lack of Parliamentary staff to assist in the administration of Parliamentary affairs and, in particular, in carrying out the research which is needed for Parliaments to hold the Executive to account. Fundamentally, such challenges result from the fact that the Parliament receives insufficient funding, and is dependent for this funding on the Executive, which may not be keen to see a stronger Parliament.

Third, Parliament is constrained by the Political System. In Zambia, the constitution fails to establish a clear role and powers for the Parliament. And even without this fundamental building block in place, the reality shows that the Parliament is very weak compared to the Executive (e.g., the President is in power to dissolve the Parliament). With the Executive being in control of all major areas of legislation, and with various degrees of subordination imposed, the Parliament cannot fulfill its oversight function.

In addition to Executive dominance, there are other aspects of the political system which hinder Parliamentary performance. These include a very dominant ruling party (e.g., the speaker of the Parliament appoints MPs to committees!), the lack of an effective opposition (or even the idea of an opposition), electoral systems which hinder accountability (e.g., simple majority vote), and both overly-strict party discipline which constrains MPs’ actions, and an absence of political parties based around different political ideologies with the result that voters are denied real political choices.

Thinking of this framework the role of civil society becomes very apparent. Civil society evolves to give an alternative to missing participation, accountability, transparency and checks and balances vis-a-vis the Executive because the political system - by the functional disability of the Parliament – does not render this to its citizenry otherwise.

The Parliamentary Performance is shaped by the wider social and cultural environment. Beyond the formal political system, Parliamentary performance is shaped too by the social and cultural environment in which the Parliament is situated. Put differently, the formal rules of politics are often at odds with the informal realities of social relations and cultural understandings.

In Zambia, where the social system is one of neo-patrimonialism and “big men” looking after their clients, MPs are expected to provide school fees, medical bills, roads and financing for their constituents and constituencies, rather than being expected to represent their interests in processes of legislation and oversight.

Relatedly, when the state is the primary source of economic power, and politics is about providing resources for constituents, politicians who are not able to access the state’s resources and hence are unable to provide for their constituents find themselves without much of a role to play. This is preventing the emergence of effective opposition parties, particularly when it is combined with the practice of “floor-crossing” in Zambia, with MPs switching parties to access resources and postings. Parliamentary performance also suffers because of weak links and a lack of consultation between Parliaments and other elements of civil society, the media, the private sector, trade unions and so on.

This is were civil society has a major role to play: enhancing the capabilities of CSOs and Parliamentarians through CSOs alike and creating links in order to uplift the role of the Parliament even through the constitutional debate and the constitutional content: CSOs are natural allies to the National Assembly!

Aid Relationships Marginalise the Parliament: Cooperating Partners share some responsibility for weak Parliamentary performance. The focus of donor interventions in support of good governance has tended to be on the Executive; an effective state has been equated with an effective Executive and civil service. Whilst there is clearly value in donors working closely with the Executive, an overly-exclusive focus on this branch of government does risk marginalising Parliaments.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have also marginalised Parliaments. Whereas civil society participation was encouraged, Parliaments were excluded from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process (and even the FNDP process). And Parliaments have not had the right to see or scrutinise the conditions attached to loans offered by the international financial institutions.

This undermines democratic domestic accountability and risks further marginalising Parliaments. There are some limited signs of change in the behaviour of Cooperating Partners and the international financial institutions. It is to be hoped that donor interest in, and Paris Declaration commitments on, aid effectiveness, particularly those relating to ownership and domestic accountability, will accelerate changes in donor practice.

Civil Society as an intermediary to strengthen the Parliament: To be effective, Parliamentary strengthening must use civil society as an intermediary. As civil society is - and always was - a natural ally to the Parliamentary theory and practice and what a performing Parliament should look like, and CSOs have always maintained good working relationships. Finally CSOs are another representation of the citizenry and are often created because of the missing capabilities of the Parliament.

Quarterly Bulletin

Bulletin 74 4th Quarter 2007

Bulletin 74
4th Quarter 2007