MOORE’S STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
Moore’s (1995) “strategic triangle” was used to find out how the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) “measured up” to his three tests. Mark Moore is a Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. After fifteen years of research, observation, and teaching about what public sector executives should do to improve the performance of public enterprises, Moore responds by recommending the strategic triangle. Through different case studies, Moore reveals how through the strategic triangle managers can achieve their true goal of producing public value, which in people-centre development would contribute to self-reliance.
LEGITIMACY AND POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY
The first test for legitimacy and political sustainability revealed that there was qualified support for the PRSP from the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and beneficiaries. The lack of demonstrable government leadership and contradictions in the PRSP that are linked to its neo-liberalism seem to have eroded the NGOs and beneficiaries’ confidence in the PRSP’s long-term ability to meaningfully address the plight of poor small-scale farmers.
The study revealed that government lacks strong leadership in terms of commitment and transparency when dealing with NGOs. The respondents also see several contradictions in the PRSP that undermine their support for and legitimacy of the PRSP.
First, the PRSP focus on (external) private sector investment has lead the Zambian government to design short-term interventions, which do not, in the short-term, significantly improve the quality of life of the beneficiaries and, in the long term, undermine self-reliance. Government indicates that it wants to help struggling farmers but it does not back this up with necessary financial commitment because their neo-liberalism policies of fiscal constraint implemented to impress the World Bank and IMF and foreign investors. Poor, small-scale farmers are disadvantaged by the absence of a favorable market mechanism and the use of the government’s Food Reserve Agency to purchase farm produce at low prices.
Secondly, the PSRP’s out grower schemes, which are informed by neo-liberal thinking, do not promote consultation with small-scale farmers. The terms governing their participation in the out grower schemes are dictated by the owners of the schemes who exploit vulnerable small-scale farmers by paying them ridiculously low prices.
All these constraints undermine legitimacy and support for the PRSP and strangle support from small-scale farmers.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY
The findings on the second test, which is about administrative and operational feasibility, reveal that organisations implementing the PRSP seem to have the basic operational management systems in place. However, the study revealed important factors which hinder the operational management of the PRSP. These are: inadequate financial and human resources, late arrival and mismanagement of resources, lack of credit schemes for farmers, lack of infrastructure, lack of coordination, the vastness of the country and natural disasters.
These factors directly hinder the operation management of implementing the PRSP. They also reveal that the PRSP is an over ambitious policy because it has not developed programmes that match the capacity of government, donors, and NGOs. The strategies aimed at capacity building among poor small-scale farmers are inadequate because they are not geared to making poor small-scale farmers self-reliant and they do not promote their genuine participation by the beneficiaries in the PRSP programmes.
VALUE OF THE PRSP TO THE BENEFICIARIES
The third test deals with the substantive value of the PRSP to the beneficiaries. The general impression of the respondents is that there is some improvement in the beneficiaries’ lives but that substantive value has not been added because there is no evidence that poor farmers are becoming more self-reliant.
The study revealed that some development practitioners were convinced that the neo-liberal policy of growth at all costs, found in Zambia’s PRSP had contributed greatly to further impoverishing the poor. The promotion of private investment which is a key focus of neo-liberalism is not pro-poor and has not made any significant impression on the lives of the poor.
The major stumbling block to implementing the PRSP’s programmes to assist poor small-scale farmers is the neo-liberal policy of reducing public spending and relying on attempts to make the agricultural sector attractive to foreign investors in order to grow agricultural production. There have not been significant increases in investment in the agricultural sector to instil confidence in the growth-centred, investment-led approach in the PRSP.
OBSERVATIONS
It is clear from this study that the PRSP is not very different from past policies like Structure Adjustment Programme (SAP) which were based on the same neo-liberal policies that extensively damaged Zambia. The PRSP does not fully measure up to Moore’s three tests. One of the main problems has to do with the PRSP adopting a growth-centred approach to development that is promoted by neo-liberal thinking, which places economic growth before the development of the poor small-scale farmers.
It is in understanding how the PRSP is hog tied by neo-liberalism, that we as a nation currently in the process of instituting the 5th National Development Plan (NDP) can explore alternatives that would actually improve the lives of the small-scale farmers. What alternatives are there for Zambia?
People-centred development offers an alternative development route. The main principles of people-centred are self-reliance, human needs oriented, endogenous, ecologically sound, and based on structural transformation. These principles have been promoted by some social movements and NGOs running projects in rural areas for example, the Kasis Agricultural Training Centre (KTC) has designed programmes that ensure longer term sustainability of the beneficiaries in agriculture by promoting organic farming and, for me, such projects may offer hope for poor Zambian farmers.
The problem for the Zambian government is that it has little scope to adopt radical alternative approaches because it is bound by the HIPC agreements. The challenge for government is to continue working with the World Bank and the International Monitoring Fund (IMF) while creating the space within its policies on agriculture to support NGOs that use people-centred, bottom-up approaches to work towards self-reliance among poor small-scale farmers.
CONCLUSION
The feasibility of pro poor development strategies among small-scale farmers is one area for further research. Another is how government can work within policy boundaries defined by the World Bank and the IMF and create the space within its policies to sustain the work of NGOs that adopt pro poor strategies.
Kelly Michelo, S.J.
Jesuit Community,
Kitwe.
